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Abstract:
This paper analyses indirect effects of social housing policy (SHP) in a segmented housing market. A
two segment-housing ladder, where equity determines up trading, shows how SHP-measures
targeting either housing supply or housing demand impact market developments and individual
housing careers. When addressing market developments the paper considers house prices and
housing supply. Analysing housing careers we highlights the ability of households indirectly exposed
to SHP to trade up a housing ladder. The segmented housing market model contains both
multipliers, along the lines of the Balanced Budget Multiplier of Haavelmo (1945), and non-neutral
price effects across segments. These features allow some novel results when discussing indirect
effects of SHP. Relating SHP to up-trading and a housing ladder where households simultaneously
act as buyers and sellers, we first of all show the effect of SHP on the supply of used homes, an
important part of housing supply. Second, this framework makes us able to position crowding-out
across market segments. Both features are novel in the SHP-discussion. The paper also shows how
SHP might create negative indirect effects on the up-trading ability of households that do not benefit
from SHP measures.
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 1. Introduction 
For many households is a housing career characterised by equity induced up trading between 
market segments. For others, is entry into owner-occupation by itself difficult, and some are in need 
of government assistance to enter owner-occupation. While social housing policy intends to 
improve housing consumption among the latter group of households, such policies may also affect 
housing consumption among the former.       
 
The literature on social housing policy is extensive (see Apgar (1990), Priemus and Dieleman 
(2002) or Scanlon et al (2017) for interesting contributions). When analysing effects of social 
housing policy is the choice between supply- and demand side measures (see e.g. the seminal 
Galster (1997) article) and the discussion between renting and owning (see for instance Munro 
(2007), Arundel and Doling (2017) or Haff 
ner et al (2017)) dominating the debate. In addition is the extent of crowding-out at the focus of 
attention, as discussed by Murray (1983, 1999), Sinai and Waldfogel (2005), Nordvik (2006) or 
Eriksen and Rosenthal (2010)).  
 
This paper analyses social housing policy (SHP) in a segmented housing market where equity gains 
allow households to trade-up a housing ladder. The focus of the paper is on the indirect effects of 
SHP, including effects on markets and on individuals. Analysing market effects the paper highlights 
house prices and housing supply. The indirect individual effects are related to the impact of SHP on 
the ability of households that do not benefit from SHP to trade-up a housing ladder.   
 
A number of papers argue the importance of housing markets for economic developments (see for 
instance Goodhart and Hoffmann (2008), Duca et al (2011), Agnello and Schucknecht (2011) or 
Kivedal (2014)). The different papers address housing market developments quite differently. Smith 
and Rosen (1988) described a housing market as a series of overlapping submarkets differentiated 
by location, dwelling type, tenure, form, age quality and financing. A comprehensive understanding 
of housing markets may thus be contingent on analysing the interaction between market segments. 
Such an approach might however both be problematic due to data limitations, or the necessary 
simplifications, abstracting away from real housing market characteristics. The role of, and 
interaction between, different market segments, is discussed by Grey (2017), analysing market 
segment implications in a wider context, including real housing market characteristics as housing 
industry behaviour, lenders and the business cycle. The interaction between segments might impact 
a number of features, as for instance analysed by Anundsen and Røed-Larsen (2014), how the 
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decision of homeowners of whether to sell or buy first when trading up a housing ladder might 
impact a housing recovery. When analysing indirect effects of SHP, we need to stylize a segmented 
housing market model to efficiently describe relevant market characteristics, knowing that these 
simplifications come with a cost.     
Astrup et al (2015) analyses indirect effects of SHP where indirect effects denotes effects other than 
the objectives these schemes aim to support (Astrup, 2015, p.12). In a homogenous housing market 
are price effects argued most pronounced in the “lower segment”, but without any evidence of price 
compression across the market. The paper does not consider “higher segments” as they are outside 
the scope of the selective SHP measures. There is evidence of price effects from SHP both in the 
short- and in the long run. While one should expect short-run price effects from SHP, if only to 
stimulate supply, are long-run price effects more troublesome. The paper finds some evidence of 
long-run price effects from start-up loans, which might have a negative influence on the housing 
career of households that do not benefit from SHP.  
 
Analysing housing policy in general, and social housing policy more specifically, the heterogeneous 
structure of the housing market should be taken into account. Rothenberg et al (1991) states  
 
 “Housing market events and government policy initiatives which impact one submarket will have 
their primary effects in that submarket, with secondary effects appearing in other submarkets to the extent 
those submarkets are linked in substitution possibilities with the original submarket”  (Rothenberg, 1991, p. 
48) 
 
Substitution effects might be important between some segments, while equity effects might be 
important between segments (See Lee and Ung (2005) or Røed-Larsen (2010b) for the role of 
equity). Our frame of reasoning draws on Borgersen (2016, 2014a, 2014b). We consider a housing 
market that contains two segments for owner-occupied housing, starter and family homes, and is 
characterised by a housing ladder where a starter home is the first-step on the ladder. Equity gains 
from starter home appreciation allow households to climb the ladder and enter the family home 
segment. This market structure allows for both first time- and repeat buyers. A household that 
moves from a starter to a family home is simultaneously supplying a starter home and demanding a 
family home. A household entering the starter home segment is however doing just that, demanding 
a starter home. Our SHP measures are implemented in the rental market or the starter home 
segment. However, if SHP impact up-trading, prices and supply might also be affected in the family 
home segment, as policy interventions might create repercussions throughout the market.  
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Irrespective of which segment we consider, is a household often in need of external finance when 
purchasing a home. Normally are both debt-servicing ability and collateral important for a 
household’s ability to attract external finance. Borgersen (2016) shows that even though a 
mortgagor consider debt-servicing ability to be the first-line of defence against credit risk exposure, 
it might be willing to allow collateral to govern supply when housing appreciations exceed a critical 
limit. For a household trading-up the housing ladder from a starter to a family home both prevailing 
equity (the starter home price) and the purchasing price (the family home price) and, 
correspondingly, the debt-to-equity-ratio, might be affected by SHP. The segmented housing market 
structure links SHP to households’ ability to trade-up a housing ladder.      
 
One may argue SHP to contain a number of indirect effects. When stimulating the supply of social 
housing, conventional fiscal multipliers might lift domestic activity and employment, and ultimately 
housing demand and house prices. These effects might counteract the negative effect on house 
prices from increased supply. The indirect effects of SHP addressed in this paper shows how SHP 
impact both starter and family home prices, effects that are passed-through to aggregate house 
prices, even though SHP targets the starter home segment. The paper also derives conditions for 
when SHP hampers the up-trading ability and the housing career of households that do not benefit 
directly from SHP. The indirect effects are related to how the debt-to-equity ratio of a household 
trading up a housing ladder is affected by SHP. In an up trading model where both equity and the 
necessary borrowing is derived from different market segment prices, the paper shows how SHP 
impact a household’s ability to trade up a ladder by fulfilling a collateral constraint.       
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents (briefly) the two-segment 
housing market model of Borgersen (2014a,b), highlighting the demand side effects of equity 
induced up-trading. The third section introduces different SHP measures and analyses the market 
effects of SHP. The last part of the section analyses how SHP indirectly impact individual housing 
careers. The fourth section introduces the supply side effects of up-trading and analyses the same 
triangle of questions as above taking both the supply and the demand side effects of up trading into 
account. The fifth section introduces capacity constraints and profitability considerations on the 
supply side of the housing market. The last section concludes. 
 
2. A housing market with two segments and equity induced up-trading    
Borgersen (2014a, 2014b) considers a housing market with two segments for owner-occupied 
housing; starter (s) - and family (f) homes, in addition to a rental market. Figure 1 pictures the 
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housing market structure where the rental market is an alternative to owner-occupation in the starter 
home segment and the family home segment is the final step on the housing ladder. 
1
 
 
 
                    
In each market segment is the price determined by the interaction between housing supply Si and 
housing demand Di   
1)                                                      Di = Si           i = s,f. 
First, we fix supply. To highlight the role of the different market segments, as well as the interaction 
between segments, we apply a minimalistic approach to demand. We allow for one demand side 
shifter id  in each segment, a shifter that might represent both household income and credit 
availability. In each segment is demand negatively related to the segment price iP  and positively 
related to the price of alternative housing, which is either rentals R or starter homes SP , depending 
on whether we consider the first- or the second step of the housing ladder. Equity iE impacts 
demand in both segments. The demand for owner-occupied housing is, in our linear framework 
where parameters represent elasticities (which is to be discussed later).  
2)                                                   s
s
Rssss ERpPpdD   
3)                                                   fs
f
Rffff EPpPpdD   
                                                 
1
 This framework assumes that households are impatient when it comes to entering owner-occupation. The tendency for 
favoring owner-occupation over renting as a preferred way of tenure across Europe is described by Priemus and 
Dieleman (2002). Pareja-Estaway and Varo (2002, 2017) discuss problems with an unbalanced rental sector in Spain, 
highlighting the consequences of such SHP structure in an economy in crisis.  
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 In the starter home segment is equity exogenous, and we simplify by allowing 0sE . In the family 
home segment is equity endogenous and related to starter home prices sfsf PeE  . The parameter efs 
is an indicator on how starter home equity impacts the demand for family homes, and is referred to 
as the up-trading elasticity. The elasticity is non-negative. When 10  fse not all equity gains 
result in up-trading, while 1fse pictures a case where there the up-trading response exceeds the 
equity gain. Differing elasticities might be a result of variations in up-trading preferences. 
Alternatively, and which is the approach we pursue in the following, is different elasticities a result 
of different up-trading possibilities. When purchasing a home is external finance (often) necessary 
and mortgage market conditions important for the up-trading ability. We might see inelastic up-
trading with respect to equity 1fse  in situations where collateral constraints and loan-to-value 
(LTV) conditions are tight. When collateral constraints are weaker, and mortgagees accept higher 
LTV-ratios up-trading is elastic 1fse , as a given equity gain is assumed to increase mortgage 
availability.  
 
Finally, as few households move from starter to family homes due to substitution effects, we 
abstract away from these effects between starter and family homes 0fRp . These simplifications 
introduce an asymmetry in the model as the demand for family homes contains a wealth-effect but 
no substitution-effect, while the demand for starter homes has the opposite structure.  
 
The house price index P is derived from individual market segment prices Pi by 
4)                                                            P= Σi i Pi ,  
where the weight each segment has in the house price index is determined by the segment size i . 
To simplify notation we introduce net-demand (ND) in each segment as  RpSdND sRsss   and 
 fff SdND  , respectively. Net-demand is positively related to the demand shifter and 
negatively related to housing supply in each segment. In the starter home segment we have included 
the substitution effect between rentals and starter homes (the variable Rp sR ) in net-demand to allow 
rental subsidies to be a policy option in the following. In the family home segment, the endogenous 
equity component sfs Pe  is kept separate, as it is crucial for the model reasoning. 
    
Equilibrium is expressed in terms of market segment prices for starter and family homes 
respectively   
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5)                                                    s
s
s ND
p
P
1
 , 
and 
6)                                           





 s
s
fs
f
f
f ND
p
e
ND
p
P
1
. 
The house price index - using expression 4) – equals    
7)                                          s
s
fs
f
f
s
s
f
f
f
ND
p
e
pp
ND
p
P















 . 
Expression 7) shows how market segments might have both direct and indirect effects to the house 
price index. The direct price effect is determined by the segment size, scaled by the segment’s 
demand elasticity  
i
i
p

.    
The family home segment is the final step of the ladder and does not allow for any further up-
trading. The direct effect is therefore the only effect from this segment to the house price index. The 
starter home segment has however in addition an indirect effect on the index. The indirect effect is 
due to that a net-demand shock to the starter home segment creates an equity gain for starter 
homeowners. The equity gain stimulates up-trading, and impact family home prices and, eventually, 
also aggregate house prices. This indirect effect is referred to as the up-trading effect in Borgersen 
(2014a), and is driven by the up-trading elasticity between starter and family homes fse .   
 
To highlight the role of the different market segments, as well as the interplay between segments, 
we introduce some simplifications. Without loss of generality, we restrict the reasoning to a 
symmetric market structure .fS  
2
 To highlight the importance of the up-trading elasticity we 
also assume equality (and unity) between the elasticity of demand in all market 
segments 1 fS pp . This simplification, while in contrast to some real housing market features, 
brings forward the feature crucial for the model’s novel results, related to the supply of used homes 
and the positioning of crowding-out across market segments.
3
   
                                                 
2
 For variations in housing market structures see Borgersen (2014a). 
3
 Housing market elasticities is a widely focused research topic. Caldera- Sanchez and Johansson (2011) show huge 
differences in the price responsiveness of housing supply among OECD countries. A number of papers analyze price 
and income elasticities in housing demand, see for instance Glennon (1989), Fernandez- Kranz and Hon (2006) and the 
references therein. Røed- Larsen (2010a, 2014) analyzes income elasticities and Engel curves, while Røed-Larsen 
(2010b) separates between first-time entrants and current owners, when considering the slope of the housing demand 
curve. Both provide some motivation for our simplifications. Highlighting owner-occupied housing, Røed-Larsen 
(2010a) analyses the role of equity, and in particular, how equity gains might create and upward sloping demand curve 
from prevailing homeowners, while demand from first-time entrants still is downward sloping. Price gains might impact 
life-time income of homeowners differently than for renters, complicating the estimates of income elasticities for 
homeowners relative to households renting. Both these equity related effects are captured in our up-trading framework 
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 We rewrite the market segment prices and the house price index as 
5’)                                                              ss NDP   
6’)                                                  sfsff NDeNDP   
7’)                                      ffsfsfs NDNDeP    
 
Starting in the reverse order and first consider aggregate house prices, we see two prominent 
features in a segmented housing market. The first is how 0 fse makes 
fs ND
P
ND
P




 . In the 
presence of equity induced up-trading the starter home segment has a stronger impact on aggregate 
house prices than the family home segment, introducing a ladder-effect in terms of policy 
efficiency. Second, as equity gains amplify shocks the housing market is characterised by a housing 
market multiplier 1
DN
P


 (again under the assumption 0fse ), when we consider 
DNddNSdND sf  a net-demand shock equal across market segments. For market segment 
prices we see how a shock to the net-demand for family homes only impact family home prices 
1 and 0 
f
f
f
s
ND
P
ND
P




, while the net-demand in the starter home segment impacts both starter 
and family home prices  .    
In addition, we find
DN
P
DN
P
sf




 when shocks to net-demand are equal across market segments (as 
defined above). Borgersen (2014) refers to this as up-trading induced price dispersion.  
 
3. Social Housing Policy  
3a. House Prices 
The above reasoning on the housing market structure and on the market characteristics allows us 
straightforward arguments regarding the effects of SHP. We relate SHP to a situation where 
0sdND  and 0fdND , constraining SHP to the rental market and the starter home segment.
4
 
We apply a broad definition of SHP along the lines of Sandlie and Guldbrandsen (2017), including 
all types of housing that receive some form of public subsidy or social assistance, either directly or 
                                                                                                                                                                  
by the equity elasticity, and to keep thing simple we abstract away from differences in price and income elasticities. To 
simplify notation, we equate prices to net-demand when having abstracted away from differences in price elasticities.        
4
 This assumption makes the ladder effect above less relevant in the following.  
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indirectly,  which in addition to subsidised housing starts, will allow for measures to subsidise both 
renting and owner-occupation. 
5
  
We consider three policy measures: 
a) Social housing construction      00  ss dNDdS  
b) Rental subsidy    00  sdNDdR  
c) Subsidised mortgage rates and/or subsidised housing expenditures     
00  ss dNDdd  
 
The first two types of policy impact negatively on the net-demand for starter homes. Increased 
supply affects net-demand directly, while reducing the cost of renting through subsidies or 
introducing rent control will make some households substitute from owner-occupation to rental 
housing and impact negatively on the net-demand for starter homes. While subsidised construction 
is a supply side intervention is rental subsidies a demand side voucher stimulating home-owner 
outsiders to stay out of homeownership. Finally, subsiding mortgage rates and/or housing 
expenditures stimulate the net-demand for starter homes and might be allocated either to prevailing 
insiders or to current outsiders aiming for homeownership.
6
   
 
From the reasoning above we find the price effects of SHP as   
8)                             1
s
s
ND
P


                9)      0 fs
s
f
e
ND
P


                10)   fsfs
s
e
ND
P



  
In addition to the effect on starter home prices is also family home prices affected. Allowing for 
interaction between segments we find price effects in the higher end of the housing market, in 
contrast to Astrup (2015). As the starter home segment carries with it effects to the family home 
segment, the market structure exacerbates the effects on aggregate house prices.    
Looking at the partial derivatives, we see how a social housing policy multiplier 1
sND
P


 is 
contingent on 1fse .
7
 From expressions 8) and 9) we find 1fse to (also) be the condition for SHP 
created up-trading induced price dispersion 
s
s
s
f
ND
P
ND
P




 .      
                                                 
5
 Subsidized owner-occupation falls within an asset based- welfare strategy (see for instance Ronald and Doling 
(2012)), which has been highly debate in the Western hemisphere the last years.   
6
 See e.g. Nordvik (2006) for the insider-outsider issue.     
7
 We use the fact that    sffs   11 and rearrange 1
sND
P


using expression 10).  
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Compared to the initial model in section 2, both the multiplier and the price dispersion are 
contingent on a higher up-trading elasticity. The value of the up-trading elasticity, which is 
discussed further in the next section, is related to the extent equity gains increase mortgage 
availability.               
 
3b. Housing Careers  
To enter owner-occupied housing households are (often) in need of external finance, linking 
housing consumption to mortgagee behaviour. For a mortgagee is debt-servicing ability the first-
line of defence against credit-risk. Borgersen (2016) shows how a mortgagee might be willing to 
step away from the first-line of defence and allow collateral (the second-line of defence) to govern 
supply when the rate of appreciation exceeds a critical limit. In the following we assume 
appreciations to exceed this limit. We consider the impact of SHP on the ability to trade-up the 
housing ladder by analysing the effect of SHP on an up-trading households’ ability to fulfil a given 
collateral constraint. To give our reasoning some purchase we express the collateral constraint as a 
limit on the debt-to-equity (DtE)-ratio
lim








E
D
.  
For a household trading-up from a starter to a family home the starter home price represents 
prevailing equity and the family home price the purchasing price. In the absence of any financial 
savings is it necessary for a household to borrow the difference between the purchasing price of a 
family home and the selling price of a starter home to trade-up the ladder. SHP-interventions 
therefore affect the DtE-ratio both through the starter and through the family home price. While the 
effect on the starter home price produces equity gains from existing homeownership increases the 
effect on family home prices the amount necessary to borrow in order to purchase a family home.  
The DtE-ratio of a household trading up from a starter to a family home 
equals
s
sf
s
f
P
PP
P
D
DtE

 , or when inserting the expressions for the different market segment 
prices
s
fssf
ND
eNDND
DtE
)1( 
 . The impact of SHP on the ability to trade-up a ladder is seen 
from the sign of
sND
DtE

 . If 0
sND
DtE

 




  0
sND
DtE

 SHP impacts negatively 
(positively) on the up-trading ability and a households housing career, as SHP interventions reduce 
(increase) the probability of fulfilling the DtE-constraint necessary for trading up the housing 
ladder.   
 
After some rearranging, we find the effect of SHP on the DtE-ratio to equal    
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11)                                                     Initualfs
s
s
DtEe
NDND
DtE  1
1

 .  
The sign of 11) is determined by   Initialfs DtEe 1 . The current DtE-ratio is given by InitialDtE , 
while the first two components represent the effects of SHP on family- and starter homes, 
respectively. The intuition behind these two, and how they impact the up-trading ability, is seen 
given by expression 8 and expression 9. When combined )1( fse represents the net-effect from 
SHP on the DtE-ratio of an up-trading household, which in section 3a is described in relation to up-
trading induced price dispersion.  
  
When the appreciation of family homes exceed the appreciation of starter homes, and the net-effect 
of this price dispersion exceeds the prevailing DtE-ratio   Initialfs DtEe 1 , SHP increases the 
DtE-ratio necessary for up-trading and makes it more difficult. In this situation is up-trading 
contingent on a lending policy that allows for higher DtE-ratios. When   DtEe fs 1  the opposite 
situation emerges, as the appreciation of starter home prices exceeds that of family homes and 
produce an equity gain that reduces the borrowing, and thus the DtE-ratio, necessary for trading-up 
the housing ladder.
8
 The reduction in the DtE-ratio improves the ability of a household to satisfy a 
given DtE-constraint, and SHP- interventions makes up-trading easier.   
 
A SHP intervention that impacts positively on starter home prices is by itself not sufficient to claim 
negative indirect effects on individuals housing careers. As positive price effects in the starter home 
segment create equity gains for starter homeowners, a complete assessment should take both the 
effects on starter home and family home prices into account. While appreciations of starter homes 
obviously make it harder for entry into owner-occupied housing in the starter home segment, is the 
effect on the up-trading ability of current starter homeowners contingent on how starter home prices 
are affected relative to family home prices.   
 
4. Supply side extensions    
In this section, we extend our reasoning on the indirect effects of SHP by including various supply 
side extensions. As the effects of demand side vouchers are discussed earlier, we focus the 
                                                 
8
 The down-payment effect and the ability to trade up the housing ladder is related to Stein (1995) analysing prices and 
trading in a housing market with down-payment effects. 
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discussion on supply side interventions and crowding-out when introducing more realistic supply 
side characteristics. 
9
    
 
Our framework mirrors Swank (2002) as we allow for two distinct supply side components. In each 
market segment are there some newly built houses iN . In addition, we take into account that a 
household climbing the ladder put its existing home on the market and act simultaneously as a 
buyer and as a seller. The supply of starter homes SS equals newly built starter homes SN plus the 
demand for family homes
fD . At the final step of the ladder, where no further up trading is allowed, 
the supply of family homes
fS  equals the number of newly built family homes fN .  
12)                                                               fSS DNS   
13)                                                             
ff NS   
The model allows for coexistence of newly built and used homes, where we abstract away from 
depreciation of the housing stock. Thinking in terms of the Sinai and Waldfogel (2005) argument, 
where a successful housing program should either increase the number of housing units or increase 
the quality of the housing stock, we have a new SHP dimension in our model. SHP might be 
successful if, by stimulating up-trading, it increases the amount of used starter homes available at 
the marketplace. The supply of housing is affected both by an increase in the number of used and in 
the number of newly built houses fSS DNS  .  
Even if there is no increase in the number of newly built houses, housing supply might increase if 
SHP contributes to increasing the number of used homes for sale, 
.0 as long as  0 ifeven   0  fSS DNS   In fact, demand side vouchers to owner-occupation 
insiders might now be a part of a successful SHP.   
 
We find market segment prices and the house price index with our supply side extensions as  
14)                                                           fss NNDP   
15)                                                    )( fsfsff NNDeNDP   
16)                                   )()( fsfsffffsfss eNNDeNDP    
 
(As the supply side has two components we express net-demand (ND) in each segment in terms of 
newly built houses RpNdND SRSSs   and .fff NdND  ) Comparing expressions 14-16 
                                                 
9
 Focusing on supply side interventions the comparative statics shows negative price effects. When until now analysing 
shocks to net demand, comparative statics are positive but, of course, a positive shock to supply impacts net demand 
negatively, making results consistent across sections.  
International Journal of Economic Sciences Vol. VIII, No. 2 / 2019
12Copyright © 2019, TROND ARNE BORGERSEN, trond.a.borgersen@hiof.no
with expressions 5’-7’, we find the new elements of the model to be more complex price effects 
from the supply of family homes, a supply side feature not directly related to SHP.  
The intuition is straightforward. As the number of family homes increase, family home prices fall 
and up trading become easier. Up trading at lower equity levels impact negatively on the demand 
for starter homes and starter home prices. More intense up-trading, but from a lower level of starter 
home equity, brings an additional negative effect on family home prices as the equity effect from 
starter to family homes is weaker. These weaker price effects are again passed through to the house 
price index.    
 
4a. Capacity constraints – SHP, prices and housing careers 
Crowding-out is at the core of the SHP debate. When analysing crowding-out we begin with a 
simple case to highlight the role of market segment interaction. The housing industry produces both 
starter and family homes .fS NNN   We consider first a case where a capacity constraint binds 
the housing industry and the number of new homes is fixed 0N . Crowding-out occurs in the 
form of reallocation between starter and family homes fS NN  . This reallocation constraint 
may be seen as a situation where a social housing expansion stimulates the supply of starter homes 
which crowds-out private construction in the family home segment. The relation between 
subsidised and unsubsidised housing is as mentioned discussed by Murray (1983) and Murray 
(1999) and others,
10
 and this framework is an extension to this, as we position crowding-out across 
different market segments.  
 
Substituting the reallocation constraint Sf NNN   into expressions 14)-16) gives  
14’)                                                        )( sss NNNDP   
15’)                                              ))(( ssfsff NNNDeNDP   
16’)                              ))(()( fsfssfffsfss eNNNDeNDP    
 
Inserting for RpNdND SRSSs   and fff NdND  , and using the reallocation 
constraint fS NN  , links SHP directly to the crowding-out process. The comparative statics of 
a social housing expansion is  
                                                 
10
 Murray (1983) argued two mechanisms by which subsidized housing starts crowds out unsubsidized housing starts. 
Either as an increase in the supply of subsidized dwellings absorb households that otherwise would demand 
unsubsidised dwellings, or that some mortgage suppliers move from financing unsubsidised to financing subsidised 
housing. 
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17)                                                            0
s
s
dN
P
 
18)                                                            1
s
f
N
P


 
19)                                                           f
sN
P



  
While starter home prices are unaffected there is a positive effect on family home prices due to 
crowding-out of family homes. The effect on family home prices is passed through to the house 
price index in an extent determined by the size of the family home segment. When crowding-out is 
absolute, up trading makes the price effects of supply side SHP interventions more pronounced in 
the upper than in the lower end of the housing market.  
 
Higher family home prices makes up trading more difficult for starter homeowners and, as up 
trading is based on a higher equity level, is the lower level of up trading (and higher demand for 
starter homes)  balancing the increased starter home supply, keeping starter home prices unaffected. 
While starter home prices are constant, impact higher family home prices positively on the house 
price index.   
   
The indirect individual effects of SHP, as described by the up trading ability, are obviously 
negative. There are no equity gains from prevailing homeownership while purchasing prices further 
up the ladder increase. When combined, this affects positively on the DtE-ratio of an up-
trader 0
1

s
s PN
DtE

 , making any DtE-constraint harder to fulfil.   
 
4b. Profitability- SHP, prices and housing careers 
We continue by introducing profitability considerations in the housing industry. The industry 
capacity PN constrain production across the two market segments .f
P
S
P NNN   The industry 
allocates production between segments according to the 
relation 0  where)(   sff PPN measures the how the reallocation of production between 
starter and family homes responds to the price difference between segments. The government 
supplies social housing in the starter home segment oSN , making the aggregate supply of starter 
homes equal to .f
O
S
P
SS DNNS  When rearranging, and inserting for fN , the private supply of 
starter homes equals ).( sf
PP
S PPNN    From our equilibrium conditions prices are 
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20)                                                              oSss NNDP   
21)                                                      ))((
1
1 o
Ssfsff NNDeNDP 

 

 
22)                                           oSsfsffoSss NNDeNDNNDP 






 )((
1
1


  
(We simplify by defining )( PPsss NRpdND   and to keep notation consistent ff dND  ). The 
price effects of a social housing expansion are     
23)                                                         1
o
s
s
dN
P
 
24)                                                        










1


 fs
o
s
f e
N
P
 
25)                                                       



















1



 fs
fso
s
e
N
P
 
The price effects of a social housing expansion are driven by the assumed additional capacity social 
housing creates in the starter home segment and are negative across market segments. A reverse 
situation, where the supply of social housing is extracted from the industry capacity, would provide 
opposite results.  
 
When analysing crowding out our focus is on the crowding out that comes about due to the 
industry’s relative profitability considerations across market segments. Let us first again consider 
the allocation constraint where 0 PN  makes f
P
S NN  and a reallocation process driven by 
industry profitability according to the relation  . )( sff PPN   When inserting the comparative 
statics we find 
26)                                                       



















1
1




 fs
o
s
f e
N
N
 . 
The condition for when a social housing expansion stimulates the supply of family 
homes 0
o
s
f
N
N


is directly related to inelastic up trading 1fse . The reallocation process 
automatically implies crowding out in the starter home segment 0
o
s
P
S
N
N


. When, on the other hand, 
up trading is elastic 1fse with respect to equity 0o
s
f
N
N


, there is no crowding out of private 
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construction of starter homes .0
o
s
P
S
N
N


  Crowding out is related to the degree of equity induced up 
trading.  
 
Basically, the price effects of a social housing expansion are related to how the industry reallocates 
production in response to this expansion. A social housing expansion has a negative impact on all 
market segment prices, due to the assumed additional capacity it creates. (The price effects are 
reversed if the capacity effect is the opposite.) From expressions 23) and 24) we see how starter 
home prices fall more than family home prices when up trading is inelastic 1fse , which makes the 
family home segment relatively more profitable. This makes the industry shift resources from 
starter to family homes. The relatively weaker profitability in the starter home segment that 
accompanies a social housing expansion now crowds out the private supply of starter homes.  
 
When up trading is elastic 1fse family home prices fall more than starter home prices and the 
relative profitability in the starter home segment increase. The industry now shifts production 
capacity from the family home to the starter home segment. There is no crowding out of starter 
homes, and the industry shifts resources from the family home segment.  
 
Finally, looking at the effect on the up trading ability of a household indirectly exposed to a social 
housing expansion the effect is


















 1
1
1




fsInitial
s
s
e
DtE
PN
DtE . As both prices on starter 
and family homes fall, is it the relative price change which is of interest. When 1fse  we know 
that
o
S
S
o
s
f
N
P
N
P




1  and purchasing prices responds stronger to a social housing expansion, 
making up trading easier in the case of a price fall.     
 
5. Summary and discussion 
In many countries is affordable housing and SHP at the forefront of the social policy debate. In the 
SHP debate there is a discussion regarding the efficiency of SHP measures (see for instance Eriksen 
and Rosenthal, 2010). There is also a discussion on the indirect effect of SHP, including both the 
effects on households that do not benefit from SHP interventions and on the effects of SHP on 
housing markets (see Astrup et al (2015). This paper contributes to both discussions. 
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Much of the analysis on SHP is framed in a homogenous housing market framework. This paper 
analyses SHP in a segmented housing market where equity gains from existing homeownership 
allow households to trade up a housing ladder. Highlighting the role of different market segments, 
and the interaction between segments, the paper brings value added to the understanding of the 
indirect effects of SHP.  
 
In a segmented marked with equity induced up-trading the starter home segment carries more 
weight than the family home segment, when it comes to individual segments’ impact on aggregate 
house prices. Up trading implies that a household demanding a family home currently is a starter 
homeowner, making up-trading a simultaneous decision of purchasing a family home and selling a 
starter home. Entry into starter homeownership is on the other hand just a purchase of a starter 
home. If SHP targeting entry into owner-occupation stimulates up-trading, there might be 
repercussions throughout the housing market. If crowding-out is complete, price effects might be 
more pronounced in segments in the upper end of the housing market. When allowing for 
profitability considerations in the housing industry sector and allocation of production between 
segments, the paper relates crowding-out to the interaction between market segments and the extent 
of equity induced up-trading.  
  
By stimulating up-trading SHP might increase the number of used starter homes available to first-
time entrants into owner-occupation. Sinai and Waldfogel (2005) characterised a successful SHP by 
whether it affects housing availability and/or housing quality. Availability is often argued in relation 
to new construction, but how SHP impact the availability of used homes should also be taken into 
account knowing how used homes is an important part of housing supply. As many economies face 
inelastic supply side elasticities, and how increasing the level of private housing construction is 
known to be difficult, the effect on used homes should not be ignored. This paper is - to the best of 
our knowledge - novel in this discussion.  
 
A stylized housing market model comes with a cost. Abstractions ignore real housing market 
features important for evaluating SHP regimes. Even our presumed housing market ladder, and up-
trading structure we consider, might be simplifications. Instead of our presumed three-step ladder 
some households might enter, or leave, the ladder half the way up, du to divorce remarrying. Some 
households might benefit from bequests, and instead of entering the starter home segment using an 
exogenous equity component, they might benefit from parents housing equity gains. As SHP 
measures make family home prices increase, entry into starter home ownership might be easier as 
family home equity has increased. Other real housing market modifications on the supply side of 
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the model could also produce different results, as policies to subsidise rent would allow households 
to increase savings and thereby making it easier to fulfil a LTV-constraint. A rental subsidy 
targeting households otherwise kept totally outside the rental market, would have zero 
repercussions on other market segments. Allowing for a tenure flexible housing stock could 
complicate results further, and should be the topic of future research.       
 
Relating house prices to household debt, the paper also considers the debt-to-equity ratio for a 
household trading up a housing ladder and the impact of SHP on the housing career of households 
only indirectly exposed to SHP. The indirect individual effects should be seen in relation to how 
mortgage markets allow up-traders to take advantage of equity gains. When family home prices 
increase more than starter home prices ( 1fse ) SHP complicates up-trading. In this case is up-
trading contingent on a mortgage policy that accepts higher DtE-ratios. When 1fse  the starter 
home equity gain exceeds the effect on family home prices, making up trading possible even at 
lower DtE-ratios.  
   
As some households may take advantage of SHP measures while others may not, are the indirect 
effects of SHP important to understand. As many western economies experience financial 
constraints and a tendency for more difficult labour market conditions among younger generation, 
one should expect both increased demand for, as well as a more restrictive supply of SHP measures. 
If SHP are available to some, while hampering the housing careers of others, the measures might 
easily become unpopular and potentially also come under political pressure. To design proper SHP 
programs that, in addition to target the not so well off efficiently, minimizes the negative indirect 
effects, seems necessary for SHP survival.       
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